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Abstract 
During the last decade, the regulation of corporate social and environmental 
disclosure and reporting has gradually but steadily emerged. What explains its 
emergence at different levels of regulation and through varying modes of 
governance? Which political and socio-economic actors are involved? Who has 
benefitted from its emergence? The onset of the current economic and 
sustainability crisis has shown the need for a more ‘regulated capitalism’ and called 
for a re-assessment of dominant ideas about ‘CSR’ and ‘corporate governance’. 
Better transparency and disclosure have often been indicated as a solution to this 
impasse.  
The paper focuses on the emergence of Environmental, Social and Governance 
(ESG) disclosure regulation in Europe during the last decade. It is organized in four 
main sections. After introducing the argument within the literature on the 
regulation of corporate accountability, the second section offers an historical 
overview of the recursive emergence of environmental and social disclosure 
regulation. Thereafter, the paper briefly reviews the current debate over the 
regulation of ESG disclosure. In particular, it outlines the interests of the main 
constituencies involved at the EU-level: large corporations, institutional investors, 
trade unions, NGOs, professional accountants and financial analysts, public 
authorities. The last part develops an argument suggesting the current emergence 
of ESG disclosure regulation constitutes an institutional investors’ strategy to 
strengthen, on the one hand, their control over managers and, on the other hand, 
the legitimacy of their claims over companies resources.  
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Resumen 
Durante la última década la regulación de la transparencia social y ambiental ha 
surgido a un ritmo constante y gradual. ¿Cómo se explica su aparición en los 
diferentes niveles de regulación y a través de diversos sistemas de gobernanza? 
¿Qué actores políticos y socio-económicos están implicados? ¿Quién se ha 
beneficiado de su aparición? La actual crisis económica y de sostenibilidad ha 
                                                 
Article presented at the Conference on The Social Economy. Corporate Responsibility, Private Property & 
Partnerships. Workers' Rights and Cooperatives, held at the International Institute for the Sociology of 
Law, Oñati, Spain, and as part of the Summer Courses Programme of the UPV/EHU, 6-8 July 2011. 
∗ David Monciardini is PhD Candidate in Law and Society, Università degli Studi di Milano. Università degli 
Studi di Milano. Via Festa del Perdono 7, 20122, Milano, Italy. david.monciardini@unimi.it 
David Monciardini  Good Business?… 
 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 2, n. 3 (2012) 
ISSN: 2079-5971 2 
puesto de manifiesto la necesidad de un "capitalismo regulado" y una revisión de 
las ideas dominantes acerca de la RSE y el gobierno corporativo. A menudo se ha 
señalado la necesidad de una mayor transparencia y divulgación como una solución 
ante este punto muerto. 
Este artículo se centra en la aparición durante la última década de la regulación de 
la transparencia ambiental, social y de gobierno (ASG) en Europa. Está organizado 
en cuatro secciones principales. Después de contextualizar el tema en la literatura 
sobre la regulación de la responsabilidad corporativa, la segunda sección ofrece un 
panorama histórico de la aparición recurrente de la regulación de la transparencia 
ambiental y social. Posteriormente, el documento revisa brevemente el debate 
actual sobre la regulación de la transparencia ASG. En particular, se exponen los 
intereses de los principales grupos involucrados a nivel europeo: las grandes 
corporaciones, inversores institucionales, sindicatos, ONG, los contadores públicos y 
analistas financieros, autoridades públicas. La última parte sugiere que la aparición 
actual de la regulación de la transparencia ASG supone una estrategia de los 
inversores institucionales para fortalecer por un lado su control sobre los directivos, 
y por otro, la legitimidad de sus demandas sobre los recursos de las empresas. 
Palabras clave 
Responsabilidad empresarial; transparencia ambiental, social y de gobierno; 
sostenibilidad; revelación. 
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1. Introduction 
“We need to be able to identify actors pursuing rules that actually contradict those 
they were using before. This is not just a question of breaking the first set of rules, 
but of erecting new ones that at certain points prescribe something very different 
from those followed before. Then a new paradigm has come into existence.” Crouch 
(2005, p. 152) 
Widespread anxiety about the state of the Planet and increased global financial 
instability have revived claims that better regulation of corporate social and 
environmental accountability is urgently needed (Mason 2005; McBarnet et al. 
2007; Utting and Marques 2010). This debate entails a new approach to both 
Corporate Governance (CG) and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a way 
forward to transform our unsustainable economic and financial systems and 
facilitate the emergence of a more ‘just’ and ‘green’ economy (Sjåfjell 2009; Jaeger 
et al. 2011). Regulating social and environmental transparency and disclosure has 
been widely accepted as a fundamental first step in the direction of increasing 
corporate sustainability. In particular, this paper is concerned with the emerging 
regulation1 of Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) disclosure2.  
While the regulation of social and environmental disclosure is hardly a new topic – 
it has been discussed for over four decades (Unerman et al. 2007; Gray et al. 
2009; Gray 2010b)- only during the last decade we are witnessing a rapid 
development of this field that requires further theoretical and empirical analyses 
(Mason 2005; Sjåfjell 2009; Kruse and Lundbergh 2010; Vitols and Kluge 2011; 
Williams and Zumbansen 2011). Traditionally left to corporation’s willingness to be 
socially and environmentally accountable, in the last few years, it has become the 
object of a remarkable regulatory zeal (KPMG 2008; KPMG. et al. 2010). For 
instance, the European Commission (EC) has finally announced that by the end of 
2011 it will put forward a legislative proposal on non-financial disclosure, after over 
a decade of discussions. The EC efforts, as we shall see, mirror similar initiatives at 
national (i.e. France, Denmark, UK, Sweden, Spain) and global levels (i.e. Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI); UN Global Compact (UNGC); UN Principle for Responsible 
Investment (UN PRI); Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP); International Integrating 
Reporting Committee (IIRC)) and within other regulatory arenas (i.e. US, South 
Africa and China) that mark the emergence and codification of ESG disclosure 
regulation.  
What explains the rapid emergence of ESG disclosure at different levels of 
regulation and through varying modes of governance? Which political and socio-
economic actors are involved? Who has benefitted from its emergence? 
Despite its spread among academics, business leaders, NGOs and governments the 
first revealing feature of ‘ESG’ disclosure is its lack of a precise definition of this 
acronym (Bassen and Kovacs 2008). According to the summary of discussion of the 
EU ‘Workshops on disclosure of ESG information’: “ESG disclosure takes different 
forms and can be directed at diverse audiences. It covers, among other things: 
formal CSR or sustainability reports, chapters integrated in annual accounts, digital 
disclosure, advertising, information on packaging, internal communication to 
employees, subject specific publications, and responses to rating agencies or 
buyers questionnaires.” (EC 2009, p. 1) The content of such disclosure might 
concern matters as diverse as carbon emission; labour rights; biodiversity; water 
usage; health and safety; employment relations; bribery and corruption. As Rob 
                                                 
1 Regulation here is broadly defined as “all forms of formal and informal rule pertaining to some 
collective (nation, groups, sectors) where those rules are either binding to the members of that 
collective or at least significantly constrain their behaviour. This involves both public and private (self-) 
regulation […].” (van Appeldoorn et al. 2007, p. 5) 
2 This paper uses the concepts of ESG disclosure and ‘sustainability disclosure’; ‘non-financial disclosure’ 
and ‘social and environmental disclosure’ as synonyms. For further discussions see Gray (2010b). 
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Gray maintains, “to try and talk about ‘social accounting’ as a singularity is to invite 
confusion.” (Gray et al. 2009, p. 546)  
Nevertheless, there are few broad considerations that apply to social and 
environmental disclosure in general. First of all, non-financial disclosure is about 
legitimising and delegitimising existing governance structures. As has been pointed 
out, ESG disclosure has attracted a diverse range of explanations but all have 
shared some degree of concern “with legitimizing the organization as a social and 
environmental organism in addition to its dominant role as an economic one.” (Gray 
et al. 2009, p. 548) Secondly, it is also important to highlight that corporate 
accountability and disclosure is never an end in itself, rather it is a means to an end 
(Power 1997; Newell 2008). Therefore, it is crucial to assess what is the actual aim 
of transparency mechanisms and cui bono (who benefits) from changes in its 
regulation. Thirdly, a phenomenon of this type is essentially about power and 
conflicts among groups of social actors within a specific politico-economic and 
politico-ideological context. In particular, it concerns the division of rights and 
responsibilities among states, corporations, managers, investors, civil society, and 
so on (Pellizzoni 2004; Newell 2008; Mason 2005). Finally, during the last three 
decades, transparency has emerged as the single most powerful and ever-
expanding principle for regulating business-society relations (Power 1997; 
Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Braithwaite 2008). Therefore, we should bear in 
mind that in assessing the current emergence of ESG disclosure the paper is 
considering just one portion of a broader trend in law and society. 
One of the consequences of the complexity and expansion of non-financial 
disclosure is that the literature on ESG disclosure struggles to deal with such an 
interdisciplinary topic. The majority of the contributions comes from managerial and 
accounting studies. They are often rather under-theorized (Unerman et al. 2007) 
and have been criticized for being subsumed under the dominant law-and-
economics and business discourse (Gray et al. 2009). However, they offer a rather 
‘modest’ account of corporate responsibilities as aimed to voluntarily internalize 
negative environmental and social corporate externalities using market-oriented 
mechanisms (Parkinson 2006). This approach has been increasingly challenged by 
other accounts. In particular, critical political-economic scholars (Matten and Moon 
2008; Levy et al. 2009; Spence et al. 2010) have introduced a more analytical 
approach to sustainability disclosure emergence and CSR in general. The latter 
underscores the political nature of corporate accountability and considers the 
emergence of voluntary social and environmental disclosure as a neo-liberal 
hegemonic strategy to reproduce and legitimise existing power relations. Therefore, 
they often call for hard(er) regulatory mechanisms and legal obligations aimed to 
effectively tackle corporate misbehaviour. More recently a new strand of literature 
has emerged, the regulatory capitalism. This approach argues that transparency 
and disclosure are central legal principles in the emergence of a new division of 
labor between state and business actors. According to their claims, private 
governance is increasingly required to take responsibilities for issues that were 
traditionally left to the public sphere, at the same time the state has not 
disappeared. On the contrary it maintains its regulatory role and key functions of 
control (Levy-Faur 2005; Braithwaite 2008).  
Despite this mounting academic interest, the relation between corporate 
accountability and law needs further analysis. In particular, the existing literature 
struggles to bridge legal and political analyses of corporate accountability. While 
political scientists are calling for hard(er) regulation, legal and socio-legal scholars 
increasingly acknowledge the limits of traditional legal mechanisms. Taking into 
account companies’ ability in the art of ‘creative compliance’, the latter claim we 
should rather appeal to “some further, extra-legal driver not only to secure a 
commitment in business to socially responsible policies beyond the law, but to 
secure business’s responsible compliance with the law” (McBarnet 2007, p. 13) 
(Teubner et al. 1984; Parker 2002; Picciotto 2011). The aim of this paper is to 
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contribute to this debate offering a first attempt to bridge this gap. In particular it 
focuses on the recent emergence of ESG disclosure regulation as one of the most 
significant developments of this ‘new accountability movement’ in business 
regulation (McBarnet et al. 2007). Drawing on both socio-legal and critical political 
economic analyses the paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of the 
underlying interests and power relations that are fuelling its emergence.  
The paper anchors the analysis of ESG regulation within the long-running debate 
about corporate ownership and control (Berle and Means 1932; Dodd 1932; 
Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005; Aglietta and Reberioux 2005; Overbeek et al. 2007; 
Soederberg 2010). As pointed out by Colin Crouch, it is time to take a “full account 
of the giant corporation as a form of governance in its own right, and not subsume 
it within concepts of ‘lobbying’ states or ‘distorting’ markets. […] Once large firms 
are seen in this way, it is possible to investigate how they behave, not just as 
market actors, but generally within society. This opens the possibility of studying 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) in relation to theories of governance.” (Crouch 
2010, p. 26) In this sense, the study, taking a long-view at the emergence of non-
financial disclosure regulation, will put forward the following arguments: 1. After 
being separated in the 1980s, CG and CSR’s policy agendas are converging again; 
2. Rather than linear and progressive, corporate accountability has emerged 
through recursive cycles of regulation; 3. The emergence of non-financial disclosure 
regulation can be explained, to a significant extent, as the result of attempts to 
overcome the legitimation/accumulation tension that is central to the reproduction 
of capitalist societies. 4. The function of the law has been primarily to legitimize the 
dominant system of accumulation when it has been called into question.  
The paper identifies three broad phases in the emergence of non-financial 
disclosure regulation in Europe. During the 1960s and 1970s, corporate social 
reporting first emerged on the basis of ideals of ‘industrial democracy’ and workers 
participation that were high on the political agendas. During the second period, 
from the early 1980s until the end of the 1990s, non-financial disclosure 
disappeared from the political agenda and was left to ‘corporate conscience’ and 
self-regulation. Things changed again around 2000 when social and environmental 
disclosure re-emerged at different levels of regulation and through varying modes 
of governance. What explains those sudden changes? In particular what explains 
the re-emergence of non-financial disclosure during the last decade? In order to 
fully capture the transnational politics that are lying behind its emergence, the next 
section offers a brief overview of the historical development of non-financial 
disclosure regulation. The third section considers the role that six key groups of 
actors - investors; professions (i.e. accountants, financial analysts); public 
authorities; managers; NGOs; Trade Unions (TUs) – had in shaping the European 
regulation of sustainability disclosure and in the current regulatory debate (2000 - 
2010). The paper focuses in particular on the EU debate as it takes place at a 
crucial intermediate level between global norm-making and national law-making 
and exemplifies the multi-level governance that characterizes contemporary ESG 
regulation. Finally, the last section considers this empirical analysis in the light of 
the current theoretical debate on the regulation of corporate accountability.  
2. The emergence of non-financial disclosure regulation 
The debate about corporate responsibilities and accountability dates back to the 
late 1920s and 1930s. While these earlier ideas are often portrayed as mere 
precursors of contemporary ones, offering a rather linear and progressive approach 
to CSR emergence, this section argues differently for a cyclical account of the 
emergence of non-financial disclosure regulation. As maintained by socio-legal 
scholars Ireland and Pillay (2010), “the idea about the ‘socially responsible 
corporation’ which emerged in the 1930s and rose to prominence in the decades 
after the Second World War were markedly more radical than contemporary ideas 
about CSR.” (Ireland and Pillay 2010, p. 77) The earlier version, according to the 
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authors, entailed fundamental questions concerning the governance of the 
company; the principle of shareholder primacy; the aim and nature of corporate 
institutions and directors duties towards employees, consumers, creditors and 
society as a whole, as well as shareholders. The recent one, by contrast, tends to 
be premised on the dominant law-and-economics approach to CG within which 
directors are only accountable to their shareholders and large corporations are 
private entities just devoted to maximising profits. Using this framework, it is 
possible to identify three phases in the historical emergence of corporate social and 
environmental disclosure regulation.  
The first phase has its origin in the 1920s and 1930s when, as pointed out by Sir 
Adrian Cadbury, the governance of business for the first time effectively attracted 
the attention of politicians, economists, or the wider public (2006, p. 15). The 
introduction of the legal concept of ‘limited liability’ in 1862 had created a 
fundamental problem of separation between ownership and control (Solomon 
2006). In fact, on the one hand, it increased directors’ responsibilities but, on the 
other hand, gave them a greater, unchallenged power to control corporations. The 
appearance of Berle and Means’ classic book The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property (1932) offered empirical confirmation that shareholders had become 
widely dispersed and therefore they had lost control of the day-to-day running of 
corporations. As explained by Ireland and Pillay (2010, p. 80) by the early 1930s it 
was widely recognized that the separation of ownership and control involved a 
fundamental alteration of the character of corporate property rights. Shareholders 
came to be perceived as passive rentiers rather than the actual ‘owners’ of the 
company. During the 1950s and 1960s, the heydays of Fordism and 
‘managerialism’, it was commonly argued that shareholders should not be treated 
as ‘proprietors’ but equated to ‘well secured creditors’ or ‘bond-holders’ (Galbraith 
1956; Mason 1959, 1966; Goyder 1961; Wedderburn 1965).  
Although first examples of social and environmental disclosure date back to the end 
of WWI (Blowfield and Murray 2008), the regulatory debate really began at the 
zenith of Fordism, in the late 1960s, in a politico-economic and politico-ideological 
context dominated – particularly in Europe – by ideas of ‘industrial democracy’ and 
workers participation. In effect, such a debate was much more advanced in the 
1970s than in the 1980s and 1990s. For instance, Ullmann (1979) gives an 
excellent account of the strong normative and political debate on social accounting 
that was taking place in West Germany. In France, a similar debate resulted in the 
Law of 7 July 1977 that still mandates all companies with more than 300 employees 
to publish a social review. In the UK, the Accounting Standards Steering Committee 
published, back in 1975, the far-reaching The Corporate Report, aimed to “re-
examine the scope and aims of published financial reports in the lights of modern 
needs and condition.“ (ASSC 1975) In the late 1970s, we are also witnessing the 
emergence of some international frameworks concerned also with corporate social 
disclosure, in an attempt to regulate the emergent transnationalisation of business. 
In particular, the OECD issued for the first time its ‘Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises’ in 1976, as part of the Declaration on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises. 
After WWII, given the long period of stable economic growth and the relatively 
marginal role of investors and financial actors (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009; Turner et 
al. 2010), in Europe organised labour and the ‘working class’ exerted a growing 
influence on political and corporate leadership. This role appears clear also in the 
first emergence of corporate social regulation. Considering the content of non-
financial reporting, in fact, this was particularly concerned with the kind of 
information relevant to employees and trade unions. For instance, the cutting-edge 
The Corporate Report (ASSC 1975), abounds with references to employees’ wages 
and benefits, health and safety, human resources and other information relevant to 
workers. Environmental impact information was largely sacrificed in favour of social 
aspects. Furthermore, at the end of the 1970s, social reporting became a political 
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issue, it “entered a phase of general recognition and discussion among established 
interest groups in society” (Ullmann 1979, p. 123). As noted by Ullmann (1979, p. 
132) “on the political level CSR seems to focus more and more on employees 
affairs, reflecting, thereby, the current economic situation and the relative power of 
the constituencies involved.” Social reporting was seen by corporate owners and 
management as a means to deal with the growing influence of organised labour and 
to legitimise managers’ position during a period of intensified conflicts. On the other 
hand, the goal of part of the labour unions’ became to orient the discussion of 
social reporting regulation towards the subject areas for which traditionally they 
have developed policies. “Therefore, the long-term aim of their strategy is to 
increase the control of labour unions on business affairs.” (Ullmann 1979, p. 130) 
Overall, during the post-war period both in the US and, in particular, in Europe the 
critical mass of organised labour and workers induced law- and policy-makers to 
progressively introduce social and environmental criteria in the management of 
corporations in a way that is unthinkable in contemporary large firms (Teubner 
1985). As maintained by Ireland and Pillay: “Indeed, during this period it became 
widely believed not only that corporations should be run in the wider social interest 
but that they were in fact increasingly being run in this way.” (2010, p. 83)3. It is 
worth to note that, during the 1970s, Anglo-Saxon companies were consistently 
outperformed by their German and Japanese competitors and pressures for 
converging toward the stakeholder model increased. For instance, the CBI 
(Confederation of British Industry) began to suggest that companies “must have 
functions, duties and moral obligations that go beyond the immediate pursuit of 
profit and the requirements of the law.” (CBI 1973) The Bullock Committee 
proposed the adoption of a form of employee representation on companies boards 
(Bullock 1977). The early version of the EC Draft Fifth Directive on Company Law 
(EC 1972) would even have required all larger European companies to adopt a 
German-style two-tier board structure and some form of employee participation in 
corporate decision-making, but it was strongly opposed by the UK government. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, as a consequence of a broad politico-economic and 
politico-ideological transformation (Jessop 2007; Dicken 2007), the first cycle of 
non-financial regulation was interrupted for over two decades. A detailed discussion 
of this crucial and highly debated transition would go far beyond the scope of this 
paper. Nevertheless, as summarised by Colin Crouch: “Partly as a result of changes 
in technology, it was becoming feasible for major corporations to arrange their 
sourcing, production, distribution and management systems on a transnational 
scale in order to maximize economies of different commodity, labour and product 
markets. To realize the gains of such a scale of organization, firms required a 
deregulation of national financial regimes, so that they could move money around 
the world in line with the production activities. This was forthcoming in a series of 
changes during the 1980s, which quite quickly produced an almost global financial 
market. This, in turn, made possible the rise of a global financial sector.” (2010, p. 
32) Indeed, this shift has been labelled as the ‘financialization’ of the global 
economy (Aglietta and Riberioux 2005; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009) that has resulted 
in a dramatic growth in trading volume and the complexity of financial products 
(Turner et al. 2010). Crucially for our analysis this shift has magnified the economic 
power of institutional investors: pension funds, mutual funds and insurance 
companies. While in the 1970s individuals held almost 80% of equity in the US, by 
the end of the 1990s their holdings had fallen below 45% and institutional 
                                                 
3 However, as argued by Marens (2012), the way CSR evolved on the two sides of the Atlantic was 
greatly influenced by the different outcome of the 1920s debate on the regulation of corporate control 
and responsibilities. Without going into the details of a very complex debate, the author maintains that 
the American labour movement, on the contrary of the European one, was defeated by the new giant 
American corporation. As a result, while in Continental Europe regulators allowed a greater control of 
workers’ organisations on the governance of large corporations (stakeholders model), US executives 
responded by claiming to manage according to principles of social responsibilities.  
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investors’ had risen to almost 50%. Similarly in the UK individual ownership 
dropped from over 50% in the early 1960s to about 15% in 1999. At the same 
time, institutional ownership rose from 30% to over 50% (Hawley and Williams, 
2000). Share prices rather than production became the guiding lights of top 
managers’ activity with a fierce reassertion of the principle of shareholder primacy 
and of the shareholder-centred model of corporation. The prioritization of 
shareholders’ interests was justified “not so much on the (problematic) grounds of 
shareholder ‘ownership’ rights as on the consequentialist grounds that shareholder-
oriented corporations are more efficient and deliver higher rates of growth than 
their rivals. (Ireland and Pillay 2010, p. 86) During the 1990s, the German and 
Japanese economies slowed down while the US and UK increased their pace. 
Mainstream CG literature started to treat the Anglo-Saxon shareholder-centred 
model as the ‘standard’, claiming that, in the context of growing global competition, 
this model had “no important competitors” left and predicting that we will witness 
the “end of history for corporate law”. (Hansmann and Kraakman 2001, p. 50)  
Following the emergence of this transnational ‘corporate-financial nexus’ 
(Soederberg 2010), CSR rapidly dropped from policy agendas. As synthesised by 
Ireland and Pillay, while the advocates of contemporary CSR struggle to modify 
corporate behaviour through voluntarism and self-regulation a “ruthlessly 
shareholder-oriented, Anglo-Saxon model of the corporation which is antithetical to 
meaningful CSR is being entrenched around the world by legal and other means.” 
(2010, p. 91) Contemporary CSR, in effect, has been labelled as ‘modest’ 
(Parkinson 2006) and criticized for having little impact on the world’s most pressing 
problems (Visser 2011). Its paradoxical relation with the law epitomises its 
weaknesses and is particularly interesting for our research. As pointed out by Jill 
Solomon (2006, p. 25): “It is almost impossible to pursue ethical business unless it 
is demonstrated to be profitable, not only because of the attitudes of managers and 
shareholders but also because of our legal system and corporate governance 
structures.” Kinderman (2012) explicitly shows that in the UK since the late 1970s 
a modest idea of CSR has become “a quid pro quo for lighter regulation”, 
legitimising unleashed financial capitalism. The key point is that, as a consequence 
of the global convergence toward (absolute) shareholders primacy in corporate law, 
mandating social and environmental disclosure became unthinkable because this 
information was not considered as ‘material’ by investors and financial analysts. 
The definition of CSR that emerged during the 1990s as “behaviour by businesses 
over and above legal requirements, voluntarily adopted” (EC 2002, p. 347) leaves 
regulators with the puzzle: ‘how is it possible for the law to make companies 
accountable for going beyond the law?’ (Parker 2002) Therefore, ever since the 
1980s CSR had to operate very much within the prevailing shareholder-oriented 
consensus, looking for the ‘holy grail’ of the ‘business case for CSR’ as a strategy to 
create a corporate inner commitment to doing the right thing (Parker 2007).  
Given the hegemony of a shareholder-centred CG model and ‘modest’ voluntary 
CSR, the sudden re-emergence of social and environmental disclosure regulation 
around 2000 appeared surprising. Counterintuitively there has been a terrific 
growth in voluntary corporate sustainability reporting, and the success of global 
regulatory networks, such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), issuing 
guidelines and standards for ESG disclosure. Why should transnational mega-
corporations generating an output comparable to a nation state decide to 
voluntarily commit themselves to standards beyond the requirements of law? 
Something even more surprising happened by the mid-2000s when a growing 
number of institutional investors, thus far uninterested in any reference to 
environmental and social ‘non-sense’ increasingly demanded comparable and 
reliable non-financial information. According to Doreen McBarnet: “The reality is 
that describing CSR as voluntary is a little misleading. The adoption of CSR policies 
by business has taken place in a very specific context. If CSR is self-regulation by 
business, it is nonetheless self-governance that has received a very firm push from 
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external social and market forces. From the start, ‘voluntary’ CSR has been socially 
and economically driven.” (2007, p. 12). In effect, the new consensus for regulating 
non-financial disclosure emerged in a particular politico-economic and politico-
ideological context. The very public contestation by the Seattle movement; the 
onset of the Asian financial crisis and the Enron and WorldCom scandals 
delegitimized the public image of large corporations and strengthened the idea that 
financial-led capitalism was putting profits above people (Klein 2000; Bakan 2004) 
and were actually ‘out-of-control’ (Strange 1998). In particular, the Enron case 
undermined investors and consumers’ trust, further promoting the rise of two 
parallel strands of global normmaking dealing with corporate accountability.  
On the one hand, there has been a wave of reforms emphasizing minority 
shareholders’ rights; board independence; accountability to shareholders; 
maximising long-term returns, and transparency which have been referred to as CG 
regulation. On the other hand, slowly but steadily emerged a second regulatory 
strand dealing with corporate social and environmental accountability and 
concerned with global human rights and environmental and sustainability issues. 
The former used the strong ideological consensus in favour of the (absolute) 
shareholder model to obtain the adoption of binding and comprehensive CG 
guidelines and codes, inspired by the UK Cadbury Report, even in Continental 
Europe through the Directive 2006/46/EC. Justified by the necessity of avoiding 
new Enron or Parmalat cases, the codes affirmed the principle that shareholders are 
ultimately best-placed to effectively monitor CG arrangements made by directors, 
even in countries characterized by the stakeholder-model. On the other hand, the 
second strand of corporate accountability regulation was aimed at strengthening 
companies’ sense of corporate social and environmental responsibility. Struggling to 
overcome the deadlock between voluntary and mandatory rules, it resulted in a 
number of modest national, European and global norms based on internal corporate 
responsibility processes. However more recently, in particular after the onset of the 
2007 global financial crisis that further delegitimized the current finance-led 
capitalist system, ESG regulatory initiatives burgeoned again, driven by the growing 
interest of institutional investors. For instance, in 2008 the Danish Government 
enacted a new law on CSR reporting, followed by Sweden and Spain (KPMG 2010). 
Stock exchanges in China and the US introduced the requirement of disclosing non-
financial information, while the Johannesburg Stock Exchange even introduced 
mandatory integrated reporting in 2010. The International Standards Organization 
(ISO) approved the ISO 26000 standard (ISO 2010); the Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI) is working on the fourth version of its influential guidelines on sustainability 
reporting; the IASB (International Accounting Standards Board) is expected to 
publish a standard on carbon disclosure by the end of 2011 (Prada 2010, p. 59); 
the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), a global system for reporting on carbon 
disclosure emissions that has been launched in 2003, received in 2010 information 
from over 3000 organisations from 60 countries on behalf of 551 institutional 
investors. 
As we shall see in the next section, both strands of regulation are hinged on 
improving transparency and disclosure of information that are relevant in particular 
to investors. Moreover, they are both based on the expansion of the ‘fiduciary 
capitalism’ that characterised the Anglo-Saxon approach to CSR vis-à-vis the 
Continental Europe one (Teubner 1985). However, it is rather paradoxical that, 
while a series of financial crises is challenging investors’ claims of creating more 
efficient and less risky capital markets, the new social and environmental disclosure 
regulation is increasingly relying on investors to monitor corporate behaviour. This 
paper develops an argument suggesting that investors’ commitment to 
sustainability has the effect of legitimising on a new basis their control over the 
company’s resources in a context in which their role had been called into question. 
The next section will focus on the recursive EU debate on ESG disclosure during the 
2000s. In particular, it will consider the role that key groups of actors - investors; 
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professions (i.e. accountants, financial analysts); public authorities; managers; 
NGOs; Trade Unions – had in shaping the EU regulatory debate on sustainability 
disclosure.   
3. Accounting for sustainability: power, conflicts and rules 
The analysis of the emergence of social and environmental disclosure regulation in 
the last decade can benefit on the one hand from the socio-legal literature on 
recursivity of global normmaking (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Halliday 2009) and 
on the other hand from the substantial literature on the regulation of CG (Aguilera 
and Jackson 2003; Hopner 2003; Gourevitch and Shinn 2005). 
 According to Halliday (2009) recursive cycles of norm-making evolve dynamically, 
through iterations among transnational state and non-state organizations and 
actors operating at different levels of regulation. This norm-making process has a 
beginning (Time I), when either there are too few or too many conflicting norms. It 
also has an ending (Time II), “when the normative framework has a qualitatively 
different character, when behaviour of individuals, groups, and nations is 
constrained in relatively routinized, orderly, and predictable ways by norms widely 
held to be legitimate and authoritative.” (Halliday 2009, p. 16.12) Between Time I 
and Time II there can be quick or slow norm-making cycles or episodes that 
produce each time a new set of norms. An Episode begins when the problem 
attracts public attention and it appears in the regulatory agenda. As maintained by 
Halliday, the beginning of the episode requires the building up of an underlying set 
of policy problems and the initiative of charismatic norms-entrepreneurs “who 
mobilize organisations to institutionalise norms that cascade across states, IOs, and 
networks, eventually to be internalised and taken for granted.” (2009, p. 16.12) In 
effect, in our case, given the absence of strong political leadership, throughout the 
1990s, a handful of initiatives – often tiny and lacking economic and organizational 
means - began to promote regulatory initiatives like the CERES Principles; the GRI 
guidelines; AccountAbility standards; Hermes Principles; etc. marking the 
regulatory debate for many years to come. However, the current phase of non-
financial disclosure in the European regulatory arena, really began only in 2000, 
with the launch of the so-called Lisbon Agenda (O’Riordan and De Smedt 2009) and 
can be divided into two episodes. As we shall see, the first episode dates from 2000 
until 2006, while the second one started after the onset of the current financial 
crisis and it is not over yet.  
Drawing on the political-economic analysis of CG regulation elaborated in particular 
by Aguilera and Jackson (2003) and Gourevitch and Shinn (2005), we can observe, 
between the two episodes, a clear shift in terms of coalitions of constituencies 
organising and mobilising themselves to shape ESG disclosure regulation. The 
authors proposed a dynamic analysis of systems of corporate governance based on 
a coalitional approach to institutional change. It highlights the full range of 
coalitions that can feasibly emerge among capital, labour and management. 
Aguilera and Jackson (2003) outline in particular three possible kinds of coalitions. 
The ‘class coalition’ arises when interests of capital and management oppose the 
interests of labour. The ‘insider-outsider’ coalition pits labour and management 
against owners. Finally, the ‘accountability’ or ‘transparency’ coalition concerns the 
common interests of shareholders and labour vis-à-vis management. Subsequently, 
Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) have enriched the typology, adding in particular a 
fourth relevant type called a ‘corporatist coalition’ among managers, workers and 
block-holding owners against minority shareholders. Applying this framework to the 
recursive emergence of ESG regulation in Europe, we can identify the first episode 
in the 1960s and 1970s, the first emergence of social and environmental reporting, 
as driven by a ‘corporatist coalition’, while the current cycle of regulation is driven 
by a ‘transparency coalition’.  
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Analysing the EU debate on ESG disclosure that followed the launch of the Lisbon 
Agenda, we can observe that initially it revived the kind of dynamics that 
characterized the ‘corporatist era’ in a difficult attempt to reach an agreement 
between TUs and managers. In effect, the Agenda generated among TUs and NGOs 
the hope for a strong European legal framework on corporate social and 
environmental accountability. Around 2000, in fact, both Norway and France had 
approved new accounting laws mandating companies to include detailed non-
financial information in their management reports. Although motivated by the need 
to restore customers and investors trust after the Enron scandals, the Commission 
soon scaled down its ambitions facing hard and fast opposition by BusinessEurope 
and other business organizations. Already in 2001, the Green Paper that had to 
translate the Lisbon commitment for CSR into policies opted for a ‘modest’ 
definition of CSR as “a concept whereby companies integrate social and 
environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with 
their stakeholders on a voluntary basis.” (EC 2001, p. 366) In the subsequent 2002 
Communication, the Commission confirmed that CSR is “behaviour by businesses 
over and above legal requirements, voluntarily adopted.” (EC 2002, p. 347) 
Following this framework the DG Employment, charged with the task to elaborate 
an ambitious EU framework on CSR, had to exclude a priori any proposal entailing 
direct legal obligations on companies. The DG faced the usual dilemma: how to 
enforce CSR by law if it is not law? As a solution, it was agreed to focus on meta-
regulatory mechanisms of corporate accountability (Parker 2002 and 2007) based 
on what was already the dominant regulatory principle in business regulation: 
transparency and disclosure. In fact, as explained by Parkinson (2006) “while CSR 
refers to conduct that is voluntary, the techniques relied on to promote it might 
themselves involve the imposition of binding obligations.” (Parkinson 2006, p. 6) 
The idea, therefore, became to create a European regulatory framework that would 
encourage corporations, through transparency and disclosure, to become 
accountable to their stakeholders. In October 2002, the Commission launched an 
EU Multi-Stakeholder Forum (MSF) on CSR open to all parties involved: NGOs, TUs, 
companies, investors, etc. However, negotiations within the MSF proved to be very 
tough. The corporate side (i.e. BusinessEurope), in fact, on the basis of the Green 
Paper and Communication on CSR, stressed the voluntary nature of non-financial 
disclosure. TUs and NGOs, on the other side, blamed the Commission for failing to 
ensure that the EU would directly tackle the real issues of companies’ misbehaviour 
within and outside the Union. For them transparency and disclosure talks were 
already perceived as a renunciation of the option of direct legal obligations. 
Therefore they insisted on obtaining at least binding and detailed disclosure rules 
that had to be independently monitored. The debate resulted in a deadlock on the 
issue of mandatory versus voluntary rules. The main result of this phase has been 
the Directive 2003/51/EC that introduced into EU Law the requirement on 
companies to include “both financial and, where appropriate, non-financial key 
performance indicators relevant to the particular business, including information 
relating to environmental and employee matters.”  
While the EU Directive was meant to be the first step towards the creation of a EU 
framework on ESG disclosure, it has turned out to be the only one so far. In fact, in 
2005 the Barroso Commission replaced Prodi’s, and the EU initiative on CSR lost 
momentum. In particular Barroso decided to transfer from the DG Employment to 
the (more business-oriented) DG Enterprise the mandate for elaborating CSR 
policies. This political decision – described as ‘brutal’ by one of my key informants - 
was followed by a second Communication published on 22 March 2006 in which the 
new Commission strongly re-affirmed the voluntary nature of CSR (EC 2006). In 
response, the EU Parliament passed, by a large majority in plenary, a resolution 
urging the EU executive to extend legal obligations to some key aspects of 
corporate accountability, such as directors’ duties, foreign direct liability and 
mandatory disclosure for lobbyists (European Parliament 2007). The EU executive’s 
reaction was to reaffirm once again that CSR is a uniquely voluntary measure which 
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“should not be regulated at the EU level.” The MSF soon became a privileged 
partnership between companies and the DG Enterprises and, as a result, NGOs and 
TUs started to boycott and, finally, abandon the Forum. On 1st  March 2008 a 
European Alliance for CSR led by corporate representatives was created by the EU 
Commission: managers had succeeded in keeping European ESG disclosure within a 
self-governance regulatory scheme. As requested by BusinessEurope, the 
Commission explicitly suggested that non-financial disclosure should be regulated 
through voluntary guidelines, principles and standards that had been created by 
global voluntary regulatory networks, such as the UN Global Compact and the GRI.  
The outcome at the EU level mirrors what was taking place at the national level. In 
particular in the UK where, in 1997, the Labour Party obtained an historic victory, 
after years of Thatcherism, this created great expectations for fundamental reforms 
that would take into consideration corporate responsibilities. In effect in 2000 the 
first drafts of the Modern Company Law Review appeared to extend company law to 
tackle social, ethical and environmental issues broadening directors’ responsibilities. 
However, in the final draft of the Review (UK Parliament 2002, Section 3.3) any 
reference to stakeholder accountability, directors’ responsibility and non-financial 
disclosure was subordinated to a materiality constraint. This means that company 
directors would not be liable for disclosing social and environmental information 
unless they were material. Unfortunately, ‘materiality’ is such an intangible and 
abstract notion that the new legislation became unenforceable in this area 
(Solomon 2006, p. 232). The Review, however, recommended the introduction of a 
mandatory Operating and Financial Review (OFR) meant as a vehicle for directors’ 
consideration of environmental and community issues. Significantly, after three 
exhausting years of debates the bill was eventually withdrawn at the very last 
minute by the government, and replaced by a new version with a more modest 
Business Review, which met only the minimum European requirements (Villers 
2006). Eventually a mandatory OFR was introduced for government entities only4. 
This regulatory outcome confirmed the weakness of organised labour compared to 
the Fordist era: even in the UK, where the Labour had a comfortable majority, they 
had little influence on the policy agenda.  
A few years later, however, the financial crisis and rising anxiety about the state of 
the Planet revitalised the European regulatory debate on non-financial disclosure. 
This time, though, the content and mode of its regulation were different from the 
previous Episode as was also the coalition supporting its emergence. On the one 
hand, corporations had to face growing criticism for their ruthless impact on the 
environment and responsibilities for global warming. As has been pointed out, in 
fact, if we consider the global processes through which emissions are generated 
“multinational corporations and consumers had a more significant role to play in 
reducing emissions of GHG than the countries in which particular goods were 
produced” suggesting a “very different geography of responsibility”. (Bulkeley and 
Newell 2010, p. 2) On the other hand, the 2007 financial collapse struck at the 
heart of the Anglo-Saxon capitalist model and clearly showed that the finance-led 
capitalist model is, in the long term, dangerously unsustainable (Wade 2008). In 
2009, the economist Adair Turner, charged with saving the UK banking system 
from catastrophe as chief of the Financial Services Authority (FSA), argued that a 
large part of the City is “socially useless” and called for draconian regulations for 
the financial sector (Inmann 2009; Turner 2009). The link between economic and 
environmental (un)sustainability was echoed, among others, by the UN Secretary 
General warning that “the current world’s economic model is environmental suicide” 
and asking political and business leaders to embrace economic innovation in order 
to save the Planet. (Associated Press 2011).  
Without going into the details of this broad debate, the main point is that the 
finance-led capitalist system that emerged in the 1980s has been for the first time 
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radically called into question. In particular the principle of shareholders’ primacy 
was fundamentally shaken. For instance, the UK Treasury Minister Lord Myners 
blamed shareholders for not exercising their monitoring and enforcement 
responsibilities diligently, describing them as ‘absentee landlords’ (Myners 2009). 
More recently, in July 2010 the UK Stewardship Code, pointing at short-term 
investments as responsible for the disastrous financial collapse, mandated 
institutional investors to ‘disclose-or-explain’ their social and environmental 
investment policies. On July 2011, the EU released a new Green Paper on Corporate 
Governance, reviewing the Directive 2006/46/EC, explicitly warning that 
shareholders have to be more involved in CG issues if they want to be recognised 
as the owners of the company and they should also take an interest in sustainable 
returns and the long-term performance of companies. Overall, the ‘market 
efficiency’ hypothesis that underpinned shareholders’ claims for controlling 
companies’ management and resources is now widely recognised as fundamentally 
flawed (Turner et al. 2010). Currently, institutional investors have no strong 
theoretical or empirical argument to justify the pre-eminence of the shareholder-
centred CG model and there is a growing debate concerning the opportunity of 
reducing the excessive power of the financial sector (Wade 2008; Turner et al. 
2010; Williams and Zumbansen 2011) or, at least, promoting ‘green investments’ 
(Perez 2007; Richardson 2011).  
As a consequence of the external pressures for changing what is increasingly 
recognised as an obsolete and harmful economic model, ‘sustainability’ and long-
term investment are becoming the key principles that frame newly emerging ESG 
regulation. Companies started in the early 2000s to voluntarily issue ‘sustainability 
reports’ in which environmental, social and economic (ESG) aspects were all 
included and that followed the ‘triple bottom line’ approach popularised by John 
Elkington (1997), the founder of AccountAbility.  
After the onset of the current financial crisis, however the debate changed in three 
major ways (KPMG et al. 2010). First of all, we are witnessing a shift toward 
codification of ESG disclosure. In particular, there is a renewed pressure for a 
stronger role of the state in its regulatory role, to ensure a minimum level of 
disclosure and risk prevention. While in the 1990s and early 2000s the debate had 
been focused on the deadlock between mandatory and voluntary disclosure, there 
is now a strong tendency to build a multi-arena regulatory regime that goes beyond 
this dichotomy and is structured as a combination of both. A recent survey, limited 
to 30 countries around the world, already detected 142 country standards and/or 
laws with some form of ESG-related disclosure requirement or guidance. 
Approximately two thirds (65%) of them can be classified as mandatory and one 
third (35%) as voluntary (KPMG et al. 2010, p. 4). There is therefore a case for 
harmonization, especially at the European level. Secondly, there is a trend towards 
integrating ESG and financial reporting and issuing only one report. This represents 
both a sign of maturity of ESG reporting and a recognition of the limits of the 
traditional financial reporting. Although this development is still in its infancy, it is 
strongly supported by influential organizations such as the GRI and the 
International Network for Corporate Governance (INCG). The latter is an 
association of institutional investors, representing assets of over US $15 trillion, 
that has contributed to shaping global CG ‘best practice’ during the last two 
decades and has created a ‘Non-Financial Business Reporting Committee’ aiming to 
influence regulatory proposals for integrated reporting. In particular, an 
International Integrated Reporting Committee (IIRC) has been set up in 2010, 
which aimed to “create a globally accepted integrated reporting framework which 
brings together financial, environmental, social and governance information in a 
clear, concise, consistent and comparable format.” Integrating financial with social 
and environmental reporting marks the recognition that, by any realistic vision of 
markets and corporations, social and environmental considerations have a material 
impact (KPMG 2008; IIRC 2011). Lastly, the rise of sustainability as the main 
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challenge that public and private governance are currently facing has not just 
broadened the issues that are covered in the reports (biodiversity, climate change, 
etc.) but crucially widened the potential audience and issuers of reporting. In fact, 
although corporations are still the main disclosers, there are other public and 
private actors that are experimenting with sustainability reports. Reports from 
municipalities (such as the city of Amsterdam), public offices, NGOs, trade unions 
and even the US Army are bringing innovative practices and perspectives into 
sustainability reporting. At the same time the explosion of reporting represents a 
challenge for its codification, coherence and regulation. 
At the EU level, this new phase was articulated in the February 2009 speech of the 
EU Commissioner on Enterprises and Industries, Gunter Verheugen, that for the 
first time since the Barroso Commission, openly highlighted the need for talks 
among all stakeholders on ESG disclosure. As a consequence, in September 2009, 
DG Enterprise took the initiative of hosting a series of workshops on ESG disclosure 
each exploring the position of six groups of stakeholders: enterprises, investors, 
TUs, NGOs, public authorities and professions (accountants, etc). Significantly, in 
the summary of discussion of the last workshop, it emerged that ”a decision not to 
change EU policy would send a strong political message to enterprises and other 
stakeholders that the European Union believes business-as-usual is desirable and 
feasible, whereas the multiple sustainability challenges we face demand 
fundamental change. (…) ESG disclosure is a political issue not just a technical 
issue. Tinkering is not a political message”. (EC 2009c, p. 3) The conclusions of 
these workshops have been discussed during the conference organised by the 
Spanish Presidency on 25-26 March 2010 and further debated in a plenary meeting 
of the European MSF on CSR in November 2010, confirming the broadening interest 
for reviewing the existing regulation on non-financial disclosure. Thereafter, the DG 
Internal Market launched a consultation open to all interested stakeholders “with 
the view of improving existing policies on disclosure of corporate social and 
environmental information, and respect for human rights, including possible 
proposals for new initiatives and/or revised legislative measures.” (EC 2011, p. 2) 
The consultation attracted an extraordinary number of responses - over 300 - and 
in April 2011 the Commission officially announced that it will put forward a 
legislative proposal by the end of the year on non-financial disclosure. This outcome 
represents a U-turn compared to June 2007 when it explicitly excluded the need for 
further legislative initiatives (“CSR should not be regulated at the EU level”). The 
contradiction is even more apparent if we bear in mind that the Commission has 
changed neither its political majority nor its President, José Barroso. What explains 
therefore the urgency to regulate ESG disclosure? 
According to a series of preliminary interviews that have been conducted at the EU 
Commission and with some of the main stakeholders involved, institutional 
investors and financial analysts have been the driving force behind this change. A 
top EC official at DG Enterprises, in particular, recalled that the turning point came 
at the MSF in 2009 as financial analysts and not just the ‘usual suspects’ (i.e. TUs 
and NGOs) came to demand better ESG information. In effect, the Federation of 
European Financial Analysts has been very active in promoting ESG disclosure and 
in particular has elaborated “a guideline for the integration of ESG into financial 
analysis and corporate valuation” (EFFAS 2010). ‘Long-term risks’ and ‘non-physical 
or tangible capital’ are the two key concepts to understand this shift. Financial 
analysts argue that it is very likely that most industrial sectors will be affected 
directly or indirectly by the consequences of climate change policies and changes 
related to sustainability in general. Advocates of investors’ involvement in non-
financial disclosure argue that in 1980 some 80% of the market value of companies 
could be explained in traditional accounting terms, but by 2009 only 19% (Ocean 
Tomo 2010 in IIRC 2011). The expansion of the financial market as a means for 
corporate capitalization has resulted in a very large increase in the average price-
earnings ratio – the ratio of stock price to earnings per share – over the period. 
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Therefore nowadays the valuation of a company is based much more on estimated 
future earnings and not necessarily related to its physical or tangible capital (EC 
2009b, p. 3). The ability to forecast long-term risks is becoming crucial as investors 
are making decisions on a 20-30 year view of future earnings potential. 
Unfortunately, using traditional accounting information this is impossible, resulting 
in a huge gap between market value and underlying asset value (UNEP FI 2009). In 
particular, EFFAS argues that in the case of long and medium-term institutional  
investors – which in Europe are around 80% of the total – ESG disclosure is 
becoming a vital piece of information (2010). There is an ongoing debate whether 
ESG information and, in particular, carbon disclosure might help to fill this gap. For 
instance a recent German study argues that, under the current financial wisdom, 
investors have the wrong incentives about the investment strategy for replacing the 
German power plants which are reaching the end of their life cycle. Information 
about their carbon impact, they argue, would provide them with a more adequate 
picture (Garz et al. 2009). The inability of investors to evaluate ESG information is 
therefore having consequences that go beyond asset managers’ portfolios and stock 
market performance and might create systemic market risks.  
At the same time, it is important to remember that European institutional investors 
are changing. In particular as the result of pensions reforms in many EU countries, 
private pensions and investment funds are increasing in size and power. Crucially, 
they have been severely hit by the recent financial crises and are under pressure 
from clients and governments who want to make sure that their investment 
strategy is safe and long-term oriented. The growing relevance of non-financial 
information within the investor community is mainly related to greater external 
pressure following financial losses and calls to change their strategies towards long-
term investments. However, investors’ interests in mandatory ESG disclosure do 
not necessarily coincide with those of NGOs and TUs. The former tend to frame it as 
a problem of ‘risk management’, focusing on quantitative data that are considered 
as ‘material’ and that can be ‘gamed’ as financial products. NGOs and TUS, instead, 
focus on more qualitative information concerning labour and human rights 
protection, asking for legal enforcement and independent verification. Therefore 
investors’ involvement would represent a shift both in terms of the mode and 
content of non-financial disclosure compared to the traditional approach to social 
and environmental disclosure that, since the 1970s, has been driven only by TUs 
and NGOs. 
4. From efficient to sustainable investments? Legitimacy and accumulation 
in contemporary capitalism 
As noted by Rob Gray, the traditional raison d’être for social and environmental 
accounting has always been the growing concern over the power and influence of 
corporations on our model of economic and social development. “Enquiry into social 
accounting offers, inter alia, the promise (however idealized) of an international 
corporate, institutional and financial complex held substantially accountable to civil 
society for its activities. Such an accountability – if applied successfully – would 
expose much duplicity; it would make transparent the essential and unavoidable 
conflicts that a global, astonishingly successful (and probably essentially rapacious) 
capitalism generates.” (2010, p. 550) It is too early to say whether and how this 
inherent ‘combative element’ will be transferred into a more coherent regime of 
ESG regulation. However, considering its current emergence, institutional investors 
are likely to keep and even strengthen their central position of control over 
company’s resources and management. Considering the content of recent ESG 
regulation, there is more interest in climate rather than social information. The 
former is considered to produce more ‘material’ and ‘quantifiable’ Key Performance 
Indicators (KPIs), in particular relating to carbon disclosure. Considering changes in 
the mode of ESG disclosure regulation, the adoption of a ‘comply-or-explain’ 
approach to ESG disclosure adopted in Denmark (Danish Government 2008) has 
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been inspired by the CG reforms of the 1990s driven by institutional investors. As 
pointed out by Stephen Bottomley (2007), we are unlikely to see the ‘stakeholder 
model’ replacing the ‘shareholder one’. It is more likely that the contemporary 
modest CSR will evolve into a more mature multi-faced system of corporate 
accountability resulting from a mix of the two models. As the efficiency markets 
hypothesis underpinning shareholder primacy appears fundamentally shaken by 
corporate scandals and financial crises, institutional investors are increasingly 
required to assume their responsibilities towards the environment and society. As 
showed by the burgeoning numbers of pension funds and asset managers signing 
up to initiatives such as the UN PRI or the CDP, they need to picture themselves as 
‘enlightened shareholders’, reviving old ideas of ‘shareholders democracy’ 
(Soederberg 2010).  
On the other hand, the newly emerging regime of ESG disclosure represents an 
opportunity but also a threat for NGOs and TUs. In fact they can use this legal 
framework to strengthen their role as stakeholders and highlight the relevance of 
social and environmental issues. However, they have to accept an half-empty glass. 
In fact, emerging mandatory ESG disclosure would not ‘hold the corporate-financial 
complex substantially accountable to civil society for its activities’, as promised by 
traditional ideas of social accounting. NGOs and TUs pay for their economic and 
political weakness and have to rely on investors’ support to get mandatory ESG 
disclosure approved. The price to be paid is a legal framework that largely 
legitimises and re-produces existing power relations. Rather than using mandatory 
disclosure to delegitimise the financial sector, the financial sector would be able to 
use sustainability disclosure to legitimise its increasingly contested role. 
Considering this development in the light of the existing theoretical debate on 
corporate accountability regulation, it is possible to affirm that, rather 
paradoxically, law-and-economics scholars are currently the most enthusiastic 
about the emergence of ESG disclosure (Hawley, J. and A. Williams 2000 and 
2007). For instance, Davis et al. (2006),  in The New Capitalists. How Citizen 
Investors are Reshaping the Corporate Agenda, state: “Thanks to the rise of mutual 
funds and retirement plans, the actual owners of the world’s corporate giants are 
no longer a few wealthy families. Rather, they’re the huge majority of working 
people who have their pensions and life savings invested in shares of today’s 
largest companies.” Hawley and Williams’ analyse ‘the rise of fiduciary capitalism’ 
and consider institutional investors as ‘universal owners’ (2000 and 2007). 
According to their argument, due to their size, which has immensely grown in the 
last three decades, large institutional investors have become ‘universal owners’. 
This means that they have developed a natural interest in macro-economic 
performance of the economy as a whole, including infrastructures, fiscal and health 
policies, education and climate change. As they actually own a cross section of the 
whole world economy, they internalized both pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
externalities generated by individual companies that are in their portfolio. 
Therefore, it is argued, universal owners have now a financial interest in reducing 
social and environmental negative externalities.  
On the other side, critical legal and political theories, tend to expose the 
‘marketization’ and ‘capture’ of the social and environmental accountability 
movement (Shamir 2005), heavily criticizing regulatory initiatives such as the GRI 
(Levy et al. 2009) or the CDP (Newell and Paterson 2010). In particular, they are 
worried about the expansion of Anglo-Saxon fiduciary capitalism and CSR that risks 
to gradually dismantle stakeholder-oriented Continental European approaches to 
corporate accountability (Overbeek et al. 2007). Eventually, as we already 
mentioned, the regulatory capitalism approach argues that transparency and 
disclosure are central legal principles in the emergence of a new division of labour 
between state and business actors (Braithwaite 2008). According to their claims, 
private governance is increasingly required to take responsibilities for issues that 
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were traditionally left to the public sphere at the same time the state has not 
disappeared maintaining a strong regulatory role and key functions of control.   
Instead of treating the three approaches as mere accounts of newly emerging 
corporate accountability regulation, this paper suggests to consider them as 
competing projects or visions of business-society relations, underpinning and 
interpreting existing conflicts of interest among the different constituencies. 
Drawing on Paterson’s analysis of climate change governance (2010), ESG can be 
understood as a crucial field of legitimation and delegitimation of the dominant 
regime of capitalist accumulation, which in the 1970s was Fordism and nowadays, 
in Western societies at least, is financial capitalism. The law-and-economics solution 
would legitimize the dominant role of the financial sector. It is based on the Anglo-
Saxon ‘explicit’ approach to CSR, expanding fiduciary duties, and argues that 
disclosing ‘material’ information would lead to long-term investments and green 
growth. On the other side, critical legal and political theories attempt to 
delegitimize finance-led capitalism supporting the ‘implicit’, stakeholder-oriented 
Central European approach to CSR (Matten and Moon 2008). However, 
stakeholders have little power to influence European policy-makers and TUs are 
often more interested in defending what is left of the European Social Model than 
fighting for a new dawn (Hyman 2004). Lastly, the idea of ‘regulatory capitalism’ 
represents an attempt to find a compromise between the two opposed approaches, 
overcoming this theoretical and political deadlock.  
Overall, we are witnessing the rise of a ‘transparency coalition’ including not just 
the ‘usual suspects’, TUs and NGOs, but also long-term investors, such as pension 
funds and responsible investors. The origin of this coalition is in the European CG 
reforms that strengthened the rights of minority shareholders and transparency and 
disclosure requirements across Europe (Hopner 2003; Gourevitch and Shinn 2005). 
However, this perspective entails a number of theoretical and legal challenges that 
need further analyses. We may mention here only three issues. First of all, more 
empirical research should be conducted on changes in the content and mode of ESG 
regulation. Second, the actor-centred political-economic analysis of CG regulation 
(Aguilera and Jackson 2003; Gourevitch and Shinn 2005) has to be adapted to the 
issue of CSR and sustainability. In particular, some actors, such as NGOs and local 
communities have to be considered. Lastly, the emergence of a more ‘sustainable’ 
regime of accumulation’ requires the definition of a new theoretical model of 
‘sustainable companies’ (Sjåfjell 2009; Kruse and Lundbergh 2010; Vitols and Kluge 
2011;Williams and Zumbansen 2011). 
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